DANIEL BODANSKY of the Arizona State University states that geoengineering, a concept encompassing a variety of approaches to counteract the effects of greenhouse gas emissions, covering Solar radiation management (limiting sunlight reaching the earth, through such diverse techniques such as cloud whitening, stratospheric aerosol injection or space-based mirrors) and Carbon dioxide removal (through enhanced weathering of rocks, mechanical trees, ocean fertilization) could increasingly become more salient if efforts to negotiate a new international agreement take too long to succeed. He states that unless the Kyoto Protocol could either be dramatically increased in scope or replaced by a new, more comprehensive agreement, global emissions will continue to rise and based on the current emissions trajectories, CO2 emissions could triple or quadruple by end of the century rather than double as has been currently estimated, potentially resulting in far more disastrous, non-linear effects of climate change.
In his discussion paper for the Harvard project on climate agreements, "Governing Climate Engineering: Scenarios for Analysis", he states that this has resulted in increasing interest in geoengineering solutions to address climate change and explores the various options currently available as well as costs and benefits of each approach. He highlights the lack of an international governance framework covering geoengineering activities including tasks such as developing norms to guide scientific research, allocating jurisdiction among states to regulate individuals, elaborating rules that constrain state behavior, and establishing procedures to limit conflict among states and predicts that governance of geoengineering was more likely to develop through the extension of existing treaty regimes to cover various types of geoengineering than through the development of a single comprehensive regime.
HUI ZHANG of the Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom reviews the history of China's production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for nuclear weapons and uses new public information to estimate the amount of highly enriched uranium and plutonium China produced at its two gaseous diffusion plants in Lanzhou and Heping and two plutonium production complexes at Jiuquan and Guangyuan.
In an article for Science and Global Security, "China’s HEU and Plutonium Production and Stocks", his new estimates for China’s HEU and plutonium range from production of 20 ± 4 tons of HEU and 2 ± 0.5 tons of plutonium while current stockpile estimates range about 16 ± 4 tons of HEU and 1.8 ± 0.5 tons of plutonium available for weapons, at the low end of most previous independent estimates(ranging between 17–26 tons of highly enriched uranium and 2.1–6.6 tons of plutonium).
He concludes that while Beijing’s current fissile stockpile could be sufficient for its current modernization program, these new estimates would be significant to assess China’s willingness to join a fissile material cutoff treaty and a multilateral nuclear disarmament.
Balachandra Patil, fellow with the Energy Technology Innovation Policy program at the Belfer Center at Harvard Kennedy School of Government states that 45% of 800 million rural population in India did not have access to electricity highlighting the failure of policies, governance and institutions around delivery of energy to rural India including inefficient targeting of subsidies. He links India's strong entrepreneurial culture, its capabilities in advanced biomass technologies and the global carbon market to propose an alternative framework to improve access to energy for rural India. In a Discussion Paper for the Belfer Center, "Modern Energy Access to All in Rural India: An Integrated Implementation Strategy", the public-private partnership model he proposes entails the creation of rural energy access authorities empowered to enable regulatory policies, deliver rural technologies and provide access of financing, while targeting entrepreneurs rather than the rural households as the end-user, with energy service companies linking rural energy projects to the global market by serving as an aggregator of carbon credits for global trade.
ROLF MOWATT-LARSEN and WILLIAM H TOBEY, fellows at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs analyze the pattern of seizures of nuclear material in the past seven years to state that elimination of the global nuclear black market been given its due because of a lack of international co-operation, organizational failures and skepticism among experts of the plausibility of nuclear terrorism. In an opinion piece for the Belfer Center, "The Armageddon Test: To Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, Follow the Uranium", they call for greater urgency and an international consensus on the nuclear threat, deeper co-operation among national intelligence and law enforcement agencies alongwith more teeth to the IAEA to eliminate the nuclear black market.
JOSEPH NYE of the Harvard University avers that the low price of entry, anonymity and asymmetries in vulnerability meant that smaller actors had greater capacity to exercise hard and soft power in a highly volatile environment such as cyberspace than in more traditional domains of world politics and could create power shifts among states such that small states could leverage asymmetrical warfare to leapfrog larger adversaries. In an essay for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, "Cyber Power", he concludes that cyber-power was unlikely to be a game-changer and that while governments would continue to be the strongest actors, the cyber-domain would increase the diffusion of power to non-state actors illustrating the importance of networks as a key dimension of power in the 21st century.
Kayhan Barzegar, senior research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran states that Iran would not concede its claim to the nuclear fuel cycle on which there is broad consensus within the Irani elite and Iran could prove vital in bringing lasting security to the Middle East. In an article in The Washington Quarterly, "Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy After Saddam", he recommends that the Obama administration engage in meaningful diplomacy with Tehran and not give in to the temptation of isolating and weakening Iran, which would impinge on U.S. goals of stability, non-proliferation and resolution of ongoing regional conflicts.