Training Afghan security forces: Lessons from the USSR

OLGA OLIKER of the RAND Corporation presents an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces from 1920 to 1989 that could inform current approaches to planning and operating with Afghan forces and overcoming cultural challenges.
In her RAND monograph, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime The Soviet Experience", she states that although the personnel of the Soviet military, ministry of the interior (MVD) and KGB were tasked with coordinating the efforts of the Afghan armed forces, the 'Sarandoy' gendarmerie-like police force, and KhAD intelligence services, respectively, there was poor co-ordination among each other and such stove-piping among the Soviets were mirrored within the Afghans and this was compounded by limited information sharing by the Soviets with their Afghan counterparts because of personal mistrust and security concerns.
The Afghan conscript army continuously experienced high desertion due to poor conditions, political, tribal, and ethnic tensions as well as targeting by insurgent groups and poor maintenance ensured that equipment was wasted while militias were encouraged which had little loyalty to the Afghan government.
She concludes that the ISAF could learn some lessons from the Soviet experience in terms of a greater Soviet willingness to deploy large numbers of police advisors, well-matched in rank and age to Afghan counterparts, better retention in volunteer Sarandoy force as well as the dangers of relying on militia.

Security transition in Afghanistan

SHANTHIE MARIET D’SOUZA fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies in Singapore argues that high low-quality recruitment, high attrition and desertion coupled with non-standard training methodologies had affected the effectiveness of the Afghan national security forces, resulting in a mismatched ethnic composition and the rush to pass responsibility onto this relatively new and fragile force could prove disastrous for the country and the region.

In an ISAS study, “Prospects for ‘Transition’ in the Afghan Security Sector: A Reality Check?”, she draws attention to indiscipline, illiteracy, drug abuse and corruption as key problems in the backdrop of a rapid expansion of the army and police creating serious concerns of leading to a hyper-militarized state with weak civilian governance structures.

She concludes that a sustainable transition in the Afghan security sector could only be achieved in combination with a corresponding transition within the civilian sector with strengthened government institutions.