OLGA OLIKER of the RAND Corporation presents an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces from 1920 to 1989 that could inform current approaches to planning and operating with Afghan forces and overcoming cultural challenges.
In her RAND monograph, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime The Soviet Experience", she states that although the personnel of the Soviet military, ministry of the interior (MVD) and KGB were tasked with coordinating the efforts of the Afghan armed forces, the 'Sarandoy' gendarmerie-like police force, and KhAD intelligence services, respectively, there was poor co-ordination among each other and such stove-piping among the Soviets were mirrored within the Afghans and this was compounded by limited information sharing by the Soviets with their Afghan counterparts because of personal mistrust and security concerns.
The Afghan conscript army continuously experienced high desertion due to poor conditions, political, tribal, and ethnic tensions as well as targeting by insurgent groups and poor maintenance ensured that equipment was wasted while militias were encouraged which had little loyalty to the Afghan government.
She concludes that the ISAF could learn some lessons from the Soviet experience in terms of a greater Soviet willingness to deploy large numbers of police advisors, well-matched in rank and age to Afghan counterparts, better retention in volunteer Sarandoy force as well as the dangers of relying on militia.
In her RAND monograph, "Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime The Soviet Experience", she states that although the personnel of the Soviet military, ministry of the interior (MVD) and KGB were tasked with coordinating the efforts of the Afghan armed forces, the 'Sarandoy' gendarmerie-like police force, and KhAD intelligence services, respectively, there was poor co-ordination among each other and such stove-piping among the Soviets were mirrored within the Afghans and this was compounded by limited information sharing by the Soviets with their Afghan counterparts because of personal mistrust and security concerns.
The Afghan conscript army continuously experienced high desertion due to poor conditions, political, tribal, and ethnic tensions as well as targeting by insurgent groups and poor maintenance ensured that equipment was wasted while militias were encouraged which had little loyalty to the Afghan government.
She concludes that the ISAF could learn some lessons from the Soviet experience in terms of a greater Soviet willingness to deploy large numbers of police advisors, well-matched in rank and age to Afghan counterparts, better retention in volunteer Sarandoy force as well as the dangers of relying on militia.
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